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Abstract
This paper defines the notion of a local equilibrium of quality q,
0 ≤ q ≤ 1, in a discrete exchange economy: a partial allocation and
item prices that guarantee certain stability properties. The quality
q measures the fit between the allocation and the prices: the closer
to 1 the better. This notion provides a graceful degradation for the
conditional equilibria of [10]: local equilibria of quality 1 are exactly
the conditional equilibria. Any local equilibrium of quality q provides,
without any assumption on the type of the agents’ valuations, an al-
location whose value is at least q
2
1+q2 the optimal fractional allocation.
In an economy in which all agents’ valuations are a-submodular, i.e.,
exhibit complementarity bounded by a ≥ 1, there is always a local
equilibrium of quality at least 1
a
. In such an economy any greedy al-
location provides a local equilibrium that is at least 11+a the optimal
fractional allocation.
Keywords: discrete exchange economies; local equilibria; item prices
1 Background
Economic theory, since Adam Smith [18], has a Leibnizian flavor: some “in-
visible hand” provides an efficient situation. It also has a distributed flavor:
there is no central command. The means by which such a feat is achieved
are prices: publicly posted prices are accepted by the agents and this enables
1
them to sell and buy to enhance their welfare without negotiating with other
agents and such sales and purchases lead to a situation that is favorable to
everybody. Le´on Walras [21] proposed a formal description of the situation
and the prices obtained, now called a competitive or Walrasian equilibrium.
Walrasian prices equate supply and demand. Once such prices are publicly
known and no one can influence them, if each agent pursues his or her own
individual interest without any consideration for others, each agent will ob-
tain exactly all he or she wants. This stands in sharp contrast with other
social situations in which, for the benefit of all, each one has to give up on
some of his or her wishes.
It was only AbrahamWald [20] who brought to the attention of economists
the problem of proving rigorously the existence of such equilibria. Intuitively,
the existence of competitive equilibria, or their enforcement in a market, de-
pends on each trader renouncing the idea of influencing the prices and on
the prices equating supply and demand. This typically happens in markets
with a large number of traders.
For economies of divisible objects, the existence of a competitive equilib-
rium has been proved under two very different types of assumptions. Arrow,
Debreu [1] and many others assume that the valuation of every trader is
concave, a very restrictive and quite unintuitive assumption: one may well
hesitate between a beef roast for x shekels and a lamb shoulder for y shekels
but not be interested in buying half the roast and half the shoulder for
x+y
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shekels. Their result holds for any number of traders. Aumann [2] as-
sumes nothing about the form of the valuations of the individual traders,
but assumes that there is a continuum of traders, also quite a restrictive
assumption.
For economies of indivisible objects, Kelso and Crawford [14] proved,
for any number of agents, the existence of a competitive equilibrium un-
der a different assumption: they assume that the valuation of each trader
is (gross) substitutes. In [15] it was shown that substitutes valuations have
zero measure among all valuations and therefore, given any substitutes valu-
ation, some arbitrarily small modification will define a valuation that is not
substitutes. The substitutes assumption is therefore very restrictive. Larger
families of valuations for which a Walrasian equilibrium always exists are
described in [19, 13, 12] but they assume some additional structure on the
set of items.
Walrasian equilibria can be considered a suitable justification of Adam
Smith’s general perspective only if a typical exchange economy has a Wal-
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rasian equilibrium. The author does not know of any result evaluating the
probability that a typical exchange economy has a Walrasian equilibrium, but
the results mentioned above, and others, show that, in a typical economy, no
Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed.
Markets cannot, in general, be assumed to possess a Walrasian equilib-
rium. But item prices are ubiquitous in markets and we should ask what
drives such prices and what is their function?
2 This paper
This paper proposes a perspective change: given an exchange economy, don’t
ask whether it possesses a Walrasian equilibrium, ask how good is the best
equilibrium. To this purpose the notion of an equilibrium of quality q, for
0 ≤ q ≤ 1 will be defined in Definition 2. An equilibrium consists of a partial
allocation and a price vector. Any partial allocation and any price vector form
an equilibrium of quality q for some 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. The notion of an equilibrium
developed in this work, termed a local equilibrium, generalizes the notion of
a a conditional equilibrium defined in [10]. A local equilibrium of quality 1,
is exactly a conditional equilibrium.
One may have preferred to consider a notion of equilibrium that gen-
eralizes that of a Walrasian equilibrium, not that of a conditional (local)
equilibrium. No such notion has been shown, so far, to have interesting
properties. Appendix D defines such a possible notion of equilibrium and
shows that, in even simple exchange economies, only equilibria of quality 0
may exist, in stark contradiction with Theorems 6 and 7 below.
Many recent works, e.g., [10, 6, 9, 3] have studied the problem of approx-
imating the social optimum, the role that prices can play in doing so and the
properties of different notions of equilibria. The general impression that one
gathers is that as long as the agents’ valuations are submodular, things are
reasonably well understood and one can justify the general perspective por-
trayed by Adam Smith, by generalizing Walras’ model. But, on the whole,
such approaches have not been convincing so far when the agents’ valuations
exhibit complementarities, as is often the case for real life agents. Section 7
of [15] introduced the notion of an a-submodular valuation, i.e., a valuation
exhibiting complementarity bounded by a, 1 ≤ a. The parameter a mea-
sures how far a valuation is from being submodular. This paper shows that
most results obtained about exchange economies of submodular agents can
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be extended to such economies of a-submodular agents: the strength of the
result obtained depends gracefully on the parameter a. Since essentially any
valuation is a-submodular for some a, this paper generalizes what is known
for exchanges of submodular agents to almost arbitrary agents.
This paper proposes an original justification for Adam Smith’s general
perspective. Each agent has an initial endowment. Agents perform simple
profitable bilateral trades: two agents agree that a single item will be trans-
ferred from one agent to the other for a certain amount of money. Such
trades have a double effect: first the social welfare is increased and secondly
item prices become more and more publicly known. After a certain time we
expect to find the economy in a state where the social welfare cannot be im-
proved upon by transfers of a single item from an agent to another (we shall
call such a situation a local optimum) and where a price is publicly known
for each item. Such prices support the allocation obtained in a way to be
described below that we shall call a local equilibrium. The quality q of a
local equilibrium measures the fit between the allocation and the prices. We
shall show that any local optimum, i.e., any allocation in which no simple
bilateral trade can be profitable to both the seller and the buyer, provides a
local equilibrium whose quality depends on the amount of complementarity
exhibited by the agents’ valuations. The less complementarity, the better
the quality. We shall also show that any local equilibrium of high quality
has a high social value, i.e., its value is close to the socially optimal value.
The general perspective becomes: the agents trade bilaterally and in doing
so item prices crystallize and all this leads to a situation in which no simple
bilateral trade can be profitable for both agents and to prices making the
situation a local equilibrium. In typical situations, we claim, the amount of
complementarity is limited, the quality of the local equilibrium obtained is
high and therefore its social value is close to optimal, but not optimal. At the
end the agents are not allocated their preferred bundle at the posted prices
but a bundle that cannot be improved upon by any simple bilateral trade
at the posted prices. If one wants to design a market in which an increased
social welfare is attained, one should design means to support trades more
complex than transfers of single items, e.g., bilateral trading of bundles or
multilateral trades.
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3 Plan of this paper
Section 4 defines discrete exchange economies, fractional allocations and the
fractional optimal allocation. Section 5 briefly recalls Walrasian equilibria
and points to an original presentation of the main results about them in an
Appendix. In Section 6 we define a notion of equilibrium, weaker than a
Walrasian equilibrium, q-local equilibrium, indexed by a quality parameter
q, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. In Section 7 we show that q-local equilibria are q
1+q
-efficient.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to the defense of the following thesis:
typical economies possess high quality local equilibria and bilateral trading
can discover them or move the economy towards them. In Section 8 we
describe and discuss examples of economies illustrating the absence of high
quality local equilibria. Section 9 recalls the bounded complementarity in-
troduced in [15]: a-submodular valuations are valuations whose degree of
complementarity is bounded by the parameter a, 1 ≤ a. Almost all valu-
ations are a-submodular for some a. It deepens their study. Section 10
provides a characterization of q-local equilibria in a-submodular economies.
Section 11 recalls the notion of a local optimum from [3]. It proves a second
welfare theorem: in an a-submodular economy, any local optimum can be
associated with a price vector to provide a 1
a
-local equilibrium. Therefore, in
an a-submodular economy every local optimum provides a high-quality local
equilibrium. In particular, if all valuations are submodular any local opti-
mum can be associated with a 1-local equilibrium. Section 12 sharpens the
results of [15] about greeedy allocations in the presence of bounded comple-
mentarity. In such situations any greedy allocation method provides a local
equilibrium and a good approximation of the social optimum. Section 13
deals with the case all agents’ valuations are substitutes. In this case Wal-
rasian equilibria are exactly those 1-local equilibria that satisfy an additional
condition: no agent is interested in exchanging one of his items for an item
he does not possess at the given prices. Section 14 presents a list of open
questions. Section 15 concludes with a reflexion on the role item prices play
in exchange economies.
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4 Exchange economies, allocations, fractional
allocations and prices
We consider exchange economies of indivisible objects, with private values,
quasi-linear utilities, no externalities, free disposal and normalization.
Definition 1 An exchange economy is defined by a finite set of indivisible
objects X, of size m, a finite set N , of size n, of agents and by n valuations:
the valuation vi : 2
X −→ R, i ∈ N describes the preferences of agent i. A
bundle D ⊆ X possesses the value vi(D) for agent i ∈ N . We shall assume
that those valuations satisfy:
• Free disposal: vi(A) ≤ vi(B), whenever A ⊆ B.
• Normalization: vi(∅) = 0.
In an exchange economy a partial allocation (hereafter called allocation)
is a function f : X −→ N ∪ {unallocated}. Item j of X is allocated to agent
f(j) or left unallocated. An allocation is total if no item is left unallocated.
The set of items allocated to agent i, f−1(i) in allocation f will be denoted by
Sfi . For an allocation f , we define its social value by: val(f) =
∑
i∈N vi(S
f
i ).
In a given exchange economy, the social value of the allocation of maxi-
mal social value is denoted M . We shall follow the convention that is now
well established in complexity theory and say that an allocation f is an a-
approximation (a ≥ 1) of the social optimum iff M ≤ a val(f).
In [5] Bikhchandani and Mamer considered fractional allocations, a gen-
eralization of the notion of an allocation . A fractional allocation consists of
a nonnegative number xDi for every i ∈ N and every D ⊆ X satisfying the
constraints:
1. for any i ∈ N , ∑
D⊆X
xDi ≤ 1, (1)
and
2. for any j ∈ X, ∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X,j∈D
xDi ≤ 1. (2)
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The value of a fractional allocation x is defined by:
val(x) =
∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X
xDi vi(D).
The value of the fractional allocation of maximal value will be denoted MF .
It is the solution of the linear program LP.
Linear Programming (LP):
Maximize ∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X
xiDvi(D) (3)
under the constraints
∑
D⊆X,j∈D
∑
i∈N
xiD ≤ 1, for all j ∈ X, (4)
∑
D⊆X
xiD ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N, and (5)
xiD ∈ [0, 1], for all i ∈ N,D ⊆ X. (6)
The optimal solution set to LP can be viewed as the set of efficient frac-
tional allocations. Agents may be allocated fractional bundles of the form:
α ∈ [0, 1]2X as long as ∑D⊆X α(D) ≤ 1 (this is constraint (5) ) and, for
each item, the sum of the fractions of it that are allocated does not ex-
ceed one (this is constraint (4) ). Agent i values the fractional bundle α at:∑
D⊆X α(D)vi(D).
Any allocation f is the fractional allocation for which xDi = 1 iff D = S
f
i
and xDi = 0 otherwise. Clearly, in any exchange economy,M is the solution of
the integer version of LP where xiD ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore we have M ≤ MF .
A price vector is a function p : X −→ R+ that assigns a nonnegative real
number (its price) to each item. The price of item j, p(j) will be denoted pj .
5 Walrasian equilibria
In preparation for Section 6 where another notion of equilibrium will be
defined, the reader can find in Appendix A the definition and the properties
of the classical notion of a Walrasian equilibrium. The presentation there is
original.
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In a Walrasian equilibrium every agent is allocated the bundle he prefers
amongst all possible bundles, if only he considers he cannot have any influence
on the prices. A Walrasian equilibrium is the best of all possible situations
for each and every agent, at the publicly posted prices.
The existence of a Walrasian equilibrium is not guaranteed in general. It
is only in exchange economies in which every agent has a (gross) substitutes
valuation that such an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, by a result of [14].
By [11], to any valuation that is not substitutes one may add unit-demand
valuations to define an exchange economy without a Walrasian equilibrium.
The family of substitutes valuations has zero measure, as shown in [15],
which implies that any substitutes valuation can be approached as close as
one wants by valuations that are not substitutes. Therefore one can say that
Walrasian equilibria are quite rare.
This paper’s goal is to propose a less optimistic but more realistic view of
the states into which economies can evolve. Agents will not find themselves
in the best of all possible worlds but in a relatively good situation, a situation
that cannot be improved upon easily.
6 Local equilibria
We shall now define the central notion of this paper. A local equilibrium
comprises a partial allocation, a price vector and a quality parameter. The
quality parameter is a real number q ∈ [0, 1]. A local equilibrium of the
highest quality, 1, is exactly a conditional equilibrium as defined in [10].
In a 1-local equilibrium, i.e., a conditional equilibrium, the allocation
gives every agent a bundle with a nonnegative utility, at the given prices.
In other terms no agent is willing to give his whole bundle back, given the
prices, but he could, for example, prefer selling a subset of his bundle or
exchanging an item k he has been allocated for an item l allocated to some
other agent and pay pl − pk. Also, no agent wishes to buy any set of items
he does not own, at the given prices.
We generalize this definition by adding a quality parameter q. The num-
ber q is a discount factor for the prices.
Definition 2 Suppose an economy E = (N,X, vi, i ∈ N) is given and let
0 ≤ q ≤ 1. A q-local equilibrium (f, p) is a pair where f is a partial al-
location of the items to the agents and p is a price vector that satisfy the
following three conditions:
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1. for any j ∈ X such that f(j) = unallocated one has pj = 0,
2. Individual Rationality for any i ∈ N one has
vi(S
f
i ) ≥ q
∑
j∈Sf
i
pj , (7)
3. Outward Stability for any i ∈ N and any A ⊆ X such that A ∩ Sfi = ∅
one has
vi(A | Sfi ) ≤
1
q
∑
j∈A
pj. (8)
We are using the same parameter q in Equations (7) and (8) for expe-
diency reasons, but we could have chosen to define local equilibria by two
different quality parameters since Lemma 2 below uses two different param-
eters. Note that Outward Stability is formulated for a bundle A, not for
a single item.
It is easy to see that
1. any allocation, with any prices, provides a 0-local equilibrium,
2. if q ≤ q′ any q′-local equilibrium is a q-local equilibrium,
3. any conditional equilibrium, and in particular any Walrasian equilib-
rium is a 1-local equilibrium, and
4. any 1-local equilibrium is a conditional equilibrium.
An example will show that a 1-local equilibrium need not be Walrasian.
Example 1 Let X = {a, b} and N = {1, 2}. Both agents are unit-value:
v1(a) = v2(b) = 4, v1(b) = v2(a) = 3 and vi(ab) = 4 for any i.
Let f be the sub-optimal allocation which allocates a to agent 2 and b to
agent 1 and let pa = pb = 2. The pair (f, p) is a 1-local equilibrium that
is not a Walrasian equilibrium. With the price vector pa = pb =
1
2
the
allocation f provides a 1
2
-local equilibrium.
The question of the existence of high quality local equilibria is postponed
to Section 8 and we shall now show that any q-local equilibrium provides a
(1 + 1
q2
)-approximation of the optimal fractional allocation.
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7 First local social welfare theorem
The first social welfare theorem says that the (partial) allocation f of any
Walrasian equilibrium has maximal social value: val(f) = M . We shall
show a similar result for q-local equilibria. Any q-local equilibrium is a 1 + 1
q2
-
approximation, i.e., is at least q
2
1+q2
efficient. The strength of this result is
that no assumption on the valuations of the agents is necessary.
Theorem 1 (First local social welfare theorem) In any exchange econ-
omy, if (f, p) is a q-local equilibrium, then val(x) ≤ (1 + 1
q2
) val(f) for any
fractional allocation x and therefore val(g) ≤ (1 + 1
q2
) val(f) for any partial
allocation g.
Proof: By Lemma 2 in Appendix B, taking a = b = 1
q
.
One sees that any 1-local equilibrium provides a 2-approximation of the
fractional optimum. Theorem 1 therefore improves on Proposition 1 in [10]:
a conditional equilibrium always provide a 2-approximation of the fractional
optimum, not only of the integral optimum. Two examples will now suggest
that Theorem 1 cannot be significantly improved. Our first example shows
that, when q = 1 the number 2 = 1 + 1
q2
cannot be improved upon.
Example 2 Suppose X = {a, b}, N = {1, 2}, v1(a) = 2, v1(b) = 1, v2(a) =
1, v2(b) = 2 and v1(ab) = v2(ab) = 2. Both agents are additive with a budget
constraint. The allocation g that gives a to 1 and b to 2 has value 4, and with
the price vector (1.5, 1.5) provides a Walrasian equilibrium. The allocation g
is therefore a fractional optimum, by Theorem 9. The allocation f that gives
b to 1 and a to 2 with price vector (1, 1) is a 1-local equilibrium of value 2, a
2-approximation.
Our second example will show that Theorem 1 cannot be significantly
improved upon for arbitrarily small values of q.
Example 3 Consider a single item and two agents. Agent 1 values the item
at 1 and agent 2 values it at ǫ > 0. The allocation of the item to agent 2
with a price of
√
ǫ is a
√
ǫ-local equilibrium. Theorem 1 claims the allocation
is a 1 + 1
ǫ
-approximation of the optimal fractional allocation. The optimal
fractional allocation has a value of 1 and therefore the allocation is, truly, a
1
ǫ
-approximation. For ǫ close to 0 Theorem 1 cannot be significantly improved.
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8 Existence
Does every exchange economy possess a 1-local equilibrium? We shall discuss
two examples. Our first example is presented in [11] as an example of an
economy without a Walrasian equilibrium.
Example 4 Let X = {a, b, c} and N = {1, 2}. The two agents have the same
valuation: v1 = v2. This valuation is symmetric: its gives a zero value to
any bundle of less than 2 items, a value of 3 to any bundle of two elements
and a value of 4 to the set X.
The optimal fractional allocation gives 1/4 of each of the three bundles of
two elements to each agent: every agent gets, on the whole, 3/4 of a bundle
and each item is part of four bundles, in equal parts. Its value is 4.5. The
values given to the dual variables by the Dual Linear Program (see Section C
of the Appendix) are π1 = π2 = 0 and pa = pb = pc = 1.5. An optimal
allocation gives all three items to any one of the agents and has value 4. Let
(f, p) be a q-local equilibrium. It must be of one of the three following types:
1. all three items are allocated to a single agent,
2. two items are allocated to an agent and one item to the other agent, or
3. two items are allocated to an agent and the third item is unallocated.
In the first case we must have
pa+pb+pc ≤ 4/q , pa+pb+pc ≥ 4 q , pa+pb ≥ 3 q , pb+pc ≥ 3 q , pa+pc ≥ 3 q
which implies q ≤ 2
√
2
3
. In the second and third case, suppose a and b are
allocated to a single agent. Then, in both cases, we must have pc = 0 and
pa + pb ≤ 3/q , pa ≥ 3 q , pb ≥ 3 q
which implies q ≤
√
2
2
≤ 2
√
2
3
. But fixing
pa = pb = pc =
9
4
√
2
and allocating all three items to agent 1 is a 2
√
2
3
-local equilibrium. We
conclude that the best quality attainable is q = 2
√
2
3
. Such quality may be
11
obtained for the socially optimal allocation, with suitable prices, but there
is no local equilibrium of quality 1. Note also that Theorem 1 guarantees
for the local equilibrium just described a social value of at least 81
34
which is
lower than its actual social value: 4.
An exchange economy has many different q-local equilibria. Our next
example enables us to consider the question: which of those will be attained?
or which of those is the best? One can think of two general answers. First,
since the prices are driving the market, one can expect the price structure to
determine the allocation that fits the prices. But one could also expect the
market activity to generate an allocation of high social value and the prices
be determined by the allocation. The question needs further research.
Example 5 Let X = {a, b, c} and N = {1, 2, 3}. Let v1(ab), v2(bc), v3(ca)
and vi(abc) for any i be equal to 1 and let the values of all other bundles, for
any i, be equal to 0.
We are interested in exploring the q-local equilibria of this economy. Let
us, first, consider prices that can be said to be reasonable, or natural, and
study the quality of local equilibria under such prices. Since the economy in
Example 5 is unchanged under a permutation of the items one could perhaps
expect that all item prices, at equilibrium, will be equal: p = pa = pb =
pc. One may notice that in the fractional optimum, of value
3
2
, the prices are
equal with p = 1
2
. In any local equilibrium of strictly positive quality, p >
0, no item is unallocated, and no agent is allocated a single item or a pair of
items that he or she values at 0. We conclude that in such an equilibrium
all items are allocated to a single agent, which, by the way, provides a social
optimum. Without loss of generality, let us assume all items are allocated to
agent 1. The constraints on the price p and the quality q are:
1 ≥ 3qp , 1 ≤ 2p
q
.
We conclude that the highest quality that can be attained by a local equi-
librium of this type is
√
2√
3
. Such quality is attained with p = 1√
6
. Note that
such a price is less than 1
2
, the price suggested by the fractional optimum.
For any inferior quality q ≤
√
2√
3
any price p in the interval [ q
2
, 1
3q
] will provide
a q-local equilibrium. For p = 1
2
the quality obtained is 2
3
.
But, aren’t there local equilibria of higher quality? Any 1-local equilib-
rium has, by Theorem 1 a value of at least 3
4
. Therefore it has value 1 and
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is an optimal allocation. Without loss of generality, we shall assume that
agent 1 receives a and b. If item c is unallocated or is allocated to one of
agents 2 or 3 we must have pc = 0, 1 ≥ pa = pc, 1 ≤ pb and 1 ≤ pa, which
is impossible. Any 1-local equilibrium must allocate all items to the same
agent. The constraints are:
1 ≥ pa + pb + pc , 1 ≥ pb + pc , 1 ≥ pa + pc.
There is a unique solution: pa = pb = 0 and pc = 1. If we consider that the
economy should attain the optimal allocation in which all items are allocated
to agent 1 and ask what are the item prices that, with such an allocation,
provide a local equilibrium of the highest quality we find that we can obtain
the highest quality, 1, with surprising prices:
• the items a and b have a zero price notwithstanding the fact they are
valued by agent 1, and
• agent 1 is ready to pay a high price for an item, c, that is useless to
him.
The explanation may be that item c is of interest to both agents 2 and 3
whereas items a and b are each of interest to one other agent only.
In the exchange economy of Example 5, should we expect an invisible
hand to drive the market to an optimal integral solution and to prices forming
a high quality local equilibrium, or should we expect this invisible hand to
drive the prices of the different items to be equal?
Note that the allocation that allocates item a to agent 2, b to agent 3 and
c to agent 1 has value 0 but is a local optimum (see Section 11). Theorem 1
then implies that all local equilibria based on this allocation have quality 0.
Note that, with equal prices and p = 1
2
an optimal integral solution such
as giving {ab} to agent 1 and letting c be unallocated satisfies all but one
condition to be a Walrasian equilibrium: every agent gets one of its preferred
bundles at the posted prices, but c stays unallocated while its price is not
zero, and therefore this is not even a local equilibrium. Should we expect to
see unallocated items with positive prices?
9 Bounded complementarity
In this section we shall recall some definitions and results from [15] and prove
some more. I wish to propose the thesis that most real life valuations have low
13
complementarity. It will be shown that most of the properties of exchange
economies of submodular agents degrade gracefully with the parameter a
when a-submodular economies are considered. We shall use vW to denote
the marginal valuation vW (A) = v(A ∪W )− v(W ) for any disjoint bundles
W , A. The following definition appears in [15].
Definition 3 Let a ≥ 1. A valuation v is said to be a-submodular iff for
any W,A ⊆ X, W ∩ A = ∅, and for any x ∈ X −W − A
vW (A ∪ {x}) ≤ vW (A) + a vW (x).
An obvious example of a valuation that is a-submodular for no a is a
valuation that values at 0 each of two items separately but values them at
a strictly positive value together. Such valuations that exhibit unbounded
complementarity have been considered in the literature (see, e.g., [17] ) but,
in real economies, it seems that complementarity is bounded. Note that if
each of the two items above have value 1 and not 0 and the pair has value 4, a
considerable complementarity, the valuation is still a 3-submodular valuation.
Theorem 2 Let v be a-submodular. For any S, T, A ⊆ X, such that S ⊆ T
and A ∩ T = ∅ we have
v(A | T ) ≤ a v(A | S).
Proof: Let v, S, T and A be as in the assumptions. We shall prove our
claim by induction on the size of A. If A = ∅ the claim is obvious. For the
induction step, let x ∈ X − A− T .
v(A ∪ {x} | T ) = v(A | T ) + v(x | A ∪ T ).
By the induction hypothesis v(A | T ) ≤ a v(A | S). Let B = A ∪ T and
C = A ∪ S. We have C ⊆ B and
v(x | B) = v(C+(B−C)+x)−v(C+(B−C)) = vC((B−C)+x)−vC(B−C) ≤
vC(B − C) + a vC(x)− vC(B − C) = a v(x | C).
We conclude that
v(A ∪ {x} | T ) ≤ a v(A | S) + a v(x | A ∪ S) = a v(A+ x | S).
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Theorem 3 Let v be a-submodular. Let A, B be disjoint bundles and for
each x ∈ A let Bx ⊆ B. Then one has:
v(A | B) ≤ a ∑
x∈A
v(x | Bx).
Proof: By induction on the size of A. For A = ∅ the claim is obvious.
For the induction step, let y ∈ X −A−B and By ⊆ B. By the induction
hypothesis and Theorem 2.
v(A+ y | B) = v(A | B) + v(y | A ∪B) ≤
a
∑
x∈A
v(x | Bx) + a v(y | By) = a
∑
x∈A+y
v(x | Bx).
The following result will be instrumental in Section 10.
Theorem 4 Let the valuation v be a-submodular.
1. For any A ⊆ S ⊆ X.
a v(A | S − A) ≥ ∑
j∈A
v(j | S − {j})
and for any A, S ⊆ X such that A ∩ S = ∅,
v(A | S) ≤ a ∑
j∈A
v(j | S).
Proof: Let A = {j1, j2, . . . , jk} and let Ai = {j1, . . . , ji−1}. We have
v(A | S − A) =
k−1∑
i=0
v(ji+1 | S −A + Ai).
By Theorem 2 we have v(ji+1 | S − {ji+1}) ≤ a v(ji+1 | S −A + Ai) and this
proves our first claim. Now, by Definition 3,
v(A | S) ≤ v(Ak | S) + a v(jk | S) ≤
v(Ak−1 | S) + a v(jk−1 | S) + a v(jk | S) ≤ . . . ≤ a
k∑
i=1
v(ji | S).
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10 Local equilibria in a-submodular economies
One of the main results of this paper is: in an exchange economy in which
every agent’s valuation is a-submodular, one may weaken the requirements
in Definition 2 to requirements dealing with a single item.
Theorem 5 In any a-submodular exchange economy, if f is a partial allo-
cation and p is a price vector that satisfy
1. for any j ∈ X such that f(j) = unallocated one has p(j) = 0,
2. for any i, k ∈ N , i 6= k and any j ∈ Sfi one has
vk(j | Sfk ) ≤ pj ≤ vi(j | Sfi − {j})
then the pair (f, p) is a 1
a
-local equilibrium and moreover, for any A ⊆ Sfi
a vi(A | Sfi − A) ≥
∑
j∈A
pj. (9)
Note that Theorem 5 guarantees more than just a 1
a
-local equilibrium.
The local equilibrium obtained also satisfies Equation (9), meaning that an
agent is unwilling to sell at the posted prices suitably discounted (upwards),
any subset of the items allocated to him. This property reinforces the sta-
bility of the equilibrium and probably its social value.
Proof: Let i ∈ N and A ⊆ Sfi . By Theorem 4,
∑
j∈A
vi(j | Sfi − {j}) ≤ a vi(A | Sfi − A).
Therefore, by our assumption, Equation (9) is satisfied and we prove the
Individual Rationality property of Definition 2 by taking A = Sfi . For the
Outward Stability property, let i ∈ N and A ⊆ X , A ∩ Sfi = ∅. By Theo-
rem 4, and our assumption
vi(A | Sfi ) ≤ a
∑
j∈A
vi(j | Sfi ) ≤ a
∑
j∈A
pj.
Definition 4 Any q-local equilibrium satisfying Equation (9) will be called
a special q-local equilibrium.
16
An example will show that Theorem 5 cannot be improved significantly.
Example 6 Suppose two items and two agents. Agent 1 values any of the
items to 1 and both items to 1 + a (a ≥ 1). His valuation is a-submodular.
Agent 2 has an additive valuation: each item is valued at 1 and the whole set
of two items at 2.
The allocation that gives both items to agent 2 with prices 1 to each item
satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 5. It is a 2
1+a
-local equilibrium since
2 ≤ 1+a
2
2, 1 ≥ 2
1+a
1 and 1 + a ≤ 1+a
2
2. When a is large, 2
1+a
is of the same
order as 1
a
.
11 Local optima
We shall now recall the definition of a local optimum as presented in [3]. It
formalizes the notion of an allocation that is Pareto-optimal under simple
transfers of single items. We shall then show that, in an a-submodular ex-
change economy, any local optimum can be associated with a price vector to
form a special 1
a
-local equilibrium. In [3] the authors show that, in a sub-
modular economy, every local optimum is a 2-approximation of the fractional
optimum. Theorem 6 generalizes this result.
In an exchange economy, agents trade items and they can trade in many
different, sometimes complex, patterns involving a number of agents. But
bilateral trades, i.e., trades between two agents seem to be most prevalent.
It even seems that, typically, bilateral trades consist of one agent selling a
bundle to another agent: one agent delivers a bundle and receives money, the
other agent gives money and receives a bundle. Most prevalent seems to be
the transfer of a single item, in exchange for money, from an agent to another
one. If we limit ourselves to the consideration of such simple bilateral actions,
we expect, at the long end, to find the economy in a situation in which no
such bilateral trade can be profitable to both the seller and the buyer. Such
situations are natural candidates for allocations that are part of some kind of
equilibrium. Such a situation has been termed a local optimum in [3]. Note
that no prices are involved here.
Definition 5 An total allocation f : X −→ N is said to be a local optimum
iff for any distinct agents i, k ∈ N , i 6= k and for any item j ∈ Sfi allocated
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to agent i, one has:
vi(S
f
i − {j}) + vk(Sfk ∪ {j}) ≤ vi(Sfi ) + vk(Sfk ), (10)
equivalently vi(j | Sfi − {j}) ≥ vk(j | Sfk ).
If the allocation of items is a local optimum, in a secondary market only
complex trades will be performed: transfers of bundles, exchanges, or trades
involving more than two agents.
Note that any allocation that maximizes social value, i.e., any global
optimum, is a local optimum. Therefore any exchange economy possesses a
local optimum.
Any local optimum defines in a natural way, for each item, a set of prices:
prices that support the allocation of the item to the agent it is allocated to
in a second price auction.
Definition 6 Let f be a local optimum and let j ∈ X. The agent f(j) is the
agent to whom j is allocated and therefore vf(j)(j | Sff(j) − {j}) ≥ vi(j | Sfi )
for any agent i 6= f(j). We say that any number α such that, for any agent
i 6= f(j)
vi(j | Sfi ) ≤ α ≤ vf(j)(j | Sff(j) − {j})
is a suitable price for item j given the local optimum f and that any price vec-
tor p such that pj is a suitable price for every item j given f is a supporting
price vector for f .
Caution: the term supporting has a different meaning in [7, 10]. The
following is obvious.
Lemma 1 Every local optimum admits a supporting price vector.
In any exchange economy one can obtain a local optimum by starting
from any allocation and executing a sequence of moves in which a single
item is transferred from an agent to another one, if this move strictly ben-
efits the social value. The procedure must terminate in a local optimum.
The complexity of finding a local optimum has been studied in [3] and its
communication complexity has been studied in [4]. It follows from results
there that the sequence of moves above can be of an exponential length even
for submodular economies.
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Theorem 6 In an a-submodular exchange economy, if f is a local optimum
and p is a supporting price vector then the pair (f, p) is a special 1
a
-local equi-
librium and val(x) ≤ (1 + a2) val(f) for any fractional allocation x. There-
fore any local optimum is a 1 + a2-approximation of the fractional optimum
and the integrality gap of an a-submodular economy is less or equal to 1 + a2.
Proof: By Theorems 5 and 1.
The following corollary is a second welfare theorem for 1-local equilibria,
i.e., conditional equilibria. It strenghtens Proposition 3 and Corollary 1
of [10] very significantly: it applies to any local optimum, not only to a
welfare maximizing allocation, and to a-submodular economies (for any a)
not only to submodular economies.
Corollary 1 In an a-submodular economy, if f is a local optimum, then
there is a price vector p such that (f, p) is a 1-local equilibrium.
Proof: By Lemma 1.
Note that, in Example 5, the valuations are not a-submodular for any
a. Theorem 6 cannot be applied to the local optimum of value 0 described
there.
Note that, in Example 6, the allocation of both items to agent 2 is a local
optimum that is a 1+a
2
-approximation of the fractional optimum. It is easy to
see that there is no worse local optimum and therefore every local optimum
is a 1+a
2
-approximation of the fractional optimum. Theorem 6 claims only
that every local optimum is a 1 + a2-approximation. I do not know of an
economy for which the bound in Theorem 6 is sharp.
Note also that the 1
a
bound on the quality of the local equilibrium holds
for any set of supporting prices, but some vectors of supporting prices may
provide local equilibria of better quality than others.
12 Greedy allocation in economies with bounded
complementarity
In Section 11 we described how, in an a-submodular exchange economy, a
local optimum defines a local equilibrium, we shall now describe a different
way to obtain a local equilibrium. The family of greedy allocation algo-
rithms introduced in [15] was claimed there to provide a 1+a-approximation
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of the integral optimum when all the agents’ valuations are a-submodular.
Such algorithms require only polynomial time. An improved result has been
presented orally at [16], to the effect that, for a = 1, they provide a 2-
approximation of the fractional optimum. We shall now show that greedy
algorithms provide a 1
a
-local equilibrium, and a 1 + a-approximation of the
fractional optimum. This is better than the 1 + a2-approximation guaran-
teed by Theorem 6. A greedy allocation can be implemented by a sequence
of single-item auctions, auctioning the items separately.
A greedy allocation consists in the choice of a total ordering of the items of
X : j1, . . . , jm. An iterative process then allocates the items one by one in the
order chosen: an item is allocated to the agent for which it has the highest
marginal value. At stage 0 we set S0i = ∅ for any i ∈ N . At stage k, for
k = 1, . . . , m we choose an agent ik such that vik(jk | Sk−1ik ) ≥ vl(jk | Sk−1l )
for any agent l and set Sk+1ik = S
k
ik
∪ {jk} and Sk+1l = Skl for any agent l,
l 6= ik. The resulting allocation f is defined by f(jk) = ik for any k. The
procedure may be used to define a price for each of the items. The price pk
of item k is fixed, at the time k is allocated, at any value less or equal to
its marginal value for the agent it is allocated to and larger or equal to its
marginal value for any of the other agents. The price of item k, once fixed,
is never modified.
Theorem 7 In an a-submodular exchange economy, any greedy allocation
algorithm results in an allocation that, with the prices defined just above,
provides a 1
a
-local equilibrium in which the discount factor in Equation (7) is
1 (not 1
a
). The allocation obtained, f , is a 1+a-approximation, i.e., val(x) ≤
(1 + a) val(f) for any fractional allocation x.
Proof: The allocation provided is a total allocation, therefore condition 1 of
Definition 2 is satisfied.
We show, by induction on k, that, for any k, 0 ≤ k ≤ m and for any agent
i:
vi(S
k
i ) ≥
∑
l∈Sk
i
pl. (11)
First, for any agent i:
vi(S
0
i ) = vi(∅) = 0 ≥
∑
l∈∅
pl.
Let i be the agent to which item k+1 is allocated. For any agent d different
from i, Sk+1d = S
k
d and Equation (11) holds for d and k+1 by the induction
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hypothesis. Since the price of k + 1, pk+1 is less or equal to item k + 1’s
marginal value for i
vi(S
k+1
i ) = vi(S
k
i ) + vi(k + 1 | Ski ) ≥
∑
l∈Sk
i
pl + pk+1 =
∑
l∈Sk+1
i
pl.
We conclude that the final allocation satisfies Individual Rationality with
q = 1.
We now want to show that for any agent i, any stage k and any bundle
A of already allocated items, A ⊆ ⋃l∈N Skl , A ∩ Ski = ∅ we have
vi(A | Ski ) ≤ a
∑
l∈A
pl. (12)
After the allocation of item k, we only need to check the two cases below.
• For the agent i to whom k has been allocated. A bundle A such that
A ∩ Sk+1i = ∅ does not include k. We have, by Theorem 3
vi(A | Ski ∪ {k}) ≤ a
∑
x∈A
vi(x | Sr(x)i ) ≤ a
∑
x∈A
px
where r(x) is the stage at which item x has been allocated.
• For any other agent j for any A that includes k. By the induction
hypothesis, Theorem 2 and the choice of pk
vj(A
′ ∪ {k} | Sj) = vj(A′ | Sj) + vj(k | Sj ∪A′) ≤
a
∑
l∈A′
pl + a vj(k | Sj) ≤ a
∑
l∈A′
pl + a pk = a
∑
l∈A
pl.
We have shown that the greedy allocation, together with the prices defined
by the greedy process satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2 with b = 1. Our
claims now follow from the theorem.
Note that the local equilibrium obtained is not, in general, a special local
equilibrium (with discount factor equal to 1) since the marginal value of
item k for the agent to whom it has been allocated is different in the final
allocation from what it was at the time k was allocated and pk was set. This
marginal value may have decreased and may now be smaller than pk.
The following follows immediately from Theorem 7 and generalizes a re-
sult of [8] for submodular economies.
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Corollary 2 In an a-submodular economy the integral gap is at most 1+ a.
The following example shows that a greedy allocation does not always
provide a special local optimum even in submodular economies.
Example 7 Consider two items a, b and two agents 1, 2. Let v1(a) =
v1(b) = 5, v1(ab) = 7 and v2(a) = 4, v2(b) = 1 and v2(ab) = 5.
Both valuations are submodular. If, in a greedy allocation, a is allocated
before b, agent 1 is allocated a and b. But, then, v1(a | b) = 2 < 4 = v2(a).
13 Substitutes economies
In an exchange economy in which all agents have a substitutes valuation,
one may pinpoint exactly which of the 1-local equilibria are Walrasian: if no
agent is interested in exchanging, at the posted prices, an item allocated to
him for an item not in his possession.
Theorem 8 In an exchange economy in which all agents have substitutes
valuations, (f, p) is a 1-local equilibrium such that for any i ∈ N , any j ∈ Sfi
and any k ∈ X − Sfi one has vi(Sfi )− vi(Sfi − j + k) ≥ pj − pk, iff (f, p) is
a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof: The if part is obvious and does not need the substitutes assumption.
For the only if part assume vi is substitutes for any agent i and that p is a
price vector. The valuation ui(A) = vi(A)−∑j∈A pj is also substitutes. The
assumptions ensure that, for every i ∈ N , ui(Sfi ) ≥ ui(A) for any A ⊆ X
such that the size of the symmetric difference Sfi ∆A is less or equal to 2.
The single improvement condition shown to be equivalent to the substitutes
property in Theorem 1 of [11] implies that Sfi maximizes ui over all subsets
of X . We conclude that (f, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium.
14 Summary and open questions
This paper proposes the notion of a q-local equilibrium to understand the role
of item prices in discrete exchange economies. It focuses on such economies
in which all agents have an a-submodular valuation. Two different processes
that build local equilibria have been put in evidence. The first one is based on
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simple bilateral trades and seems close to the way real markets function. It
provides a local optimum with a price vector that is defined by the allocation.
This allocation is a 1 + a2-approximation of the fractional optimum. The
second one is greedy allocation with historical prices, prices corresponding
to the moment the item has been allocated. It may resemble the birth of
a market accommodating more and more items. This allocation is a 1 + a-
approximation of the fractional optimum. The discrepancy in the quality of
approximations requires further study. Do random greedy allocations really
provide higher social value than the local optima obtained from random
initial allocations by sequences of simple bilateral trades? How do simple
bilateral trades perform on initial allocations that are already the result of a
greedy process?
The following questions require for further research. Can the 1 + a2-
approximation for any local optimum be improved? At the moment no a-
submodular economy with a local optimum that is only a 1+a2-approximation
is known, for a > 1. Can one prove a better approximation result for a re-
stricted class of local optima, e.g., special local optima or Pareto optimal
allocations under all bilateral trades? How prevalent can the absence of a
1-local equilibrium be? Can the optimal allocation always upport prices that
exhibit the highest quality local equilibrium? Could it be that most typical
economies have a 1-local equilibrium? Are local equilibria typically stable,
i.e., does a small change in valuations or in prices bring only a small change
in the local equilibrium? Some high quality local equilibria, as in Example 5,
seem surprising. Do all 1-local equilibria have economic significance? What
is the dynamics of the revelation of such equilibrium prices?
The results presented in this paper do not depend on the number of agents
or items. There is, I think, a general feeling that a better equilibrium can
be reached in an a large economy, i.e., an economy in which a large number
of agents actively participate. Could it be that the approximation obtained
by any local optimum in which a large number of agents are allocated a
non-empty bundle is better than the one promised in Theorem 6?
As noticed in [15] maximizing social welfare in a discrete economy is
a problem of maximizing a function over a matroid. One should consider
our results from this point of view too. Is the notion of a local maximum
interesting there? The notion of a function close to submodular?
Can the notions of local optimum and local equilibrium be of use in the
study of markets of divisible goods?
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15 Conclusion: the role of prices
The view presented in this paper is that markets attain a local equilibrium
through the advent of suitable item prices. The role of prices in this process
is significantly different from their role according to the view that markets
attain a Walrasian equilibrium. According to this last view, prices, through
a tatonnement process, converge towards equilibrium prices that are the best
possible: if agents accept those prices and trade, at those prices, to improve
their individual welfare, every agent will find himself in the best possible
situation. No profitable trade is prevented by the equilibrium prices. Apart
from the convergence towards equilibrium prices, we do not expect prices
to vary, and any divergence from the equilibrium prices can only hamper
progress towards equilibrium. If an invisible hand would reveal equilibrium
prices from the start, convergence towards equilibrium would only be sped
up.
In the local equilibrium view of prices, prices have a different role. They
play the traditional role of guiding the market towards a (local) equilibrium,
but, once such a local equilibrium is attained, those prices can prevent trades
that would improve the social welfare. Consider a q-local equilibrium (q < 1)
in which agent 1 holds an item he values at x, but that agent 2 values at
y > x. Note that the allocation is not a local optimum and that a trade
would improve the social welfare. If the price p of the item is greater than
y or less than x, no trade at price p can take place, even though it could
happen at another price. In such a situation local equilibrium prices may
have a negative effect: they can prevent an increase in social welfare resulting
from trade. There, a change in prices may enable profitable trades that were
impossible previously. We expect that changes in the revealed prices can help
the market to move from a local equilibrium to another local equilibrium of
higher social value. Such price modifications may also change the quality of
a local equilibrium, but the forces behind such process are still unclear.
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A Walrasian equilibria
In a Walrasian equilibrium (f, p), every agent i ∈ N , at the given prices p,
prefers his allocated bundle Sfi to any other bundle. For an agent i ∈ N , its
utility for bundle A ⊆ X is defined as ui(A) = vi(A)−∑j∈A pj .
Definition 7 Suppose an economy E = (N,X, vi, i ∈ N) is given. A Wal-
rasian equilibrium (f, p) is a pair where f is a partial allocation of the items
to the agents and p is a price vector that satisfy the following conditions:
1. for any j ∈ X such that f(j) = unallocated one has pj = 0,
2. for any i ∈ N and any D ⊆ X one has
ui(S
f
i ) ≥ ui(D). (13)
In a Walrasian equilibrium every agent is allocated the bundle he prefers
amongst all possible bundles, if only he considers he cannot have any influence
on the prices. A Walrasian equilibrium is the best of all possible situations
for each and every agent.
The basic properties of Walrasian equilibria are described in Theorem 9.
They summarize the two theorems of welfare economics and the results of [5]
in an original manner.
Theorem 9 • If (f, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium then val(f) = MF ,
i.e., f is a fractional optimum,
• if f is an allocation and val(f) =MF , then there exists a price vector
p such that (f, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium,
• if (f, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium and g is an allocation such that
val(g) =MF , then (g, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof: First, under the assumptions, for any fractional allocation xDi :
val(x) =
∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X
xDi vi(D) ≤
∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X
xDi vi(S
f
i ) =
∑
i∈N
vi(S
f
i )
∑
D⊆X
xDi ≤
∑
i∈N
vi(S
f
i ) = val(f).
Secondly, under the assumptions, f is the solution to the linear program
LP. The dual program DLP is described in Appendix C. We shall take the
variables pj, j ∈ X of the dual for prices in the equilibrium. It follows from
general results on linear programming, that for any i ∈ N , D ⊆ X
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• πi ≥ vi(D)−∑j∈D pj and
• if xDi > 0 then πi = vi(D)−
∑
j∈D pj.
But x
S
f
i
i = 1 and therefore
vi(S
f
i )−
∑
j∈Sf
i
pj = πi ≥ vi(D)−
∑
j∈D
pj.
For the third part of our claim, we shall show that, for any i ∈ N , one
has
vi(S
g
i )−
∑
j∈Sg
i
pj = vi(S
f
i )−
∑
j∈Sf
i
pj .
Since (f, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium, we know that, for any i ∈ N ,
vi(S
f
i )−
∑
j∈Sf
i
pj ≥ vi(Sgi )−
∑
j∈Sg
i
pj.
But, since val(g) = val(f) and then by the fact that if f(j) = unalloc one
has pj = 0
∑
i∈N
(vi(S
g
i )−
∑
j∈Sg
i
pj) =
∑
i∈N
vi(S
g
i )−
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Sg
i
pj ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(S
f
i )−
∑
j∈X
pj =
∑
i∈N
vi(S
f
i )−
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Sf
i
pj =
∑
i∈N
(vi(S
f
i )−
∑
j∈Sf
i
pj).
B A technical lemma
The following shows sufficient conditions for an allocation to be a 1 + a b-
approximation (a, b ≥ 0) of the fractional optimal allocation. It is used to
prove Theorem 1. Note that the result holds for any a, b ≥ 0, but is used
only for a, b ≥ 1, and also that in an exchange economy the agents’ val-
uations are assumed to satisfy both Free disposal and Normalization but
that Normalization is not used in Lemma 2. Its strength is that no further
assumption is made on the agents’ valuations.
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Lemma 2 In any exchange economy, let a , b ≥ 0 and assume that f is
a partial allocation and p is a price vector that satisfy the following two
conditions:
1. for any i ∈ N
b vi(S
f
i ) ≥
∑
j∈Sf
i
pj , (14)
2. for any i ∈ N and any A ⊆ X such that A ∩ Sfi = ∅ one has
vi(A | Sfi ) ≤ a
∑
j∈A
pj, (15)
then, for any fractional allocation x:
val(x) ≤ (1 + a b) val(f) + a ∑
j∈X,f(j)=unalloc
pj . (16)
Proof: By definition, val(x) =
∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X xiDvi(D). By the free disposal
assumption, then:
val(x) ≤ ∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X
xiDvi(D∪Sfi ) =
∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X
xiDvi(S
f
i )+
∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X
xiDvi(D−Sfi | Sfi ).
First, by Equation (1)
∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X
xiDvi(S
f
i ) =
∑
i∈N
vi(S
f
i )
∑
D⊆X
xiD ≤
∑
i∈N
vi(S
f
i ) = val(f).
Then, by Equation (15), then Equation (2) and finally by Equation (14) we
have
∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X
xDi vi(D−Sfi | Sfi ) ≤
∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X
a xDi
∑
j∈D−Sf
i
pj ≤
∑
j∈X
∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X,j∈D
a xDi pj =
a
∑
j∈X
pj
∑
i∈N
∑
D⊆X,j∈D
xDi ≤ a
∑
j∈X
pj = a
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Sf
i
pj + a
∑
j∈X,f(j)=unalloc
pj ≤
a b
∑
i∈N
vi(S
f
i ) + a
∑
j∈X,f(j)=unalloc
pj = a b val(f) + a
∑
j∈X,f(j)=unalloc
pj.
We conclude that val(x) ≤ (1 + a b) val(f) + a ∑j∈X,f(j)=unalloc pj.
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C Dual linear program
The dual of LP will be described now.
Dual Linear Program (DLP):
Minimize ∑
j∈X
pj +
∑
i∈N
πi (17)
under the constraints
pj ≥ 0, πi ≥ 0 for all j ∈ X, i ∈ N, and (18)
∑
j∈D
pj + πi ≥ vi(D), for all D ⊆ X and i ∈ N. (19)
D Quasi-Walrasian equilibria
A quasi-Walrasian equilibrium of quality q, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 consists of a partial
allocation and a price vector such that every agent gets from his bundle, at
the given prices, a utility that is at least the utility he would get from any
other bundle discounted by q.
Definition 8 Suppose an economy E = (N,X, vi, i ∈ N) is given and let
0 ≤ q ≤ 1. A q-quasi-Walrasian equilibrium (f, p) is a pair where f is a
partial allocation of the items to the agents and p is a price vector that satisfy
the following two conditions:
1. for any j ∈ X such that f(j) = unallocated one has pj = 0,
2. for any i ∈ N and for any A ⊆ X one has
vi(S
f
i )−
∑
j∈Sf
i
pj ≥ q (vi(A)−
∑
j∈A
pj). (20)
Clearly a pair (f, p) is a 1-quasi-Walrasian equilibrium iff it is a Walrasian
equilibrium and any allocation together with zero prices provides a 0-quasi-
Walrasian equilibrium.
The value of the allocation of a q-quasi-Walrasian equilibrium is at least
q times the social optimum.
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Theorem 10 (First social quasi welfare theorem) If (f, p) is a q-quasi-
Walrasian equilibrium, then val(f) ≥ q val(g) for any partial allocation g.
Note that the approximation q here is better than the q
2
1+q2
of Theorem 1,
but that the comparison is, here, with the integral social optimum, not with
the fractional, higher, optimum.
Proof: Let g be the social optimum. We have, by condition 1 and then
condition 2 of Definition 8:
val(f) =
∑
i∈N
vi(S
f
i ) =
∑
i∈N
(vi(S
f
i )−
∑
j∈Sf
i
pj) +
∑
j∈X
pj ≥
q
∑
i∈N
(vi(S
g
i )−
∑
j∈Sg
i
pj)+
∑
j∈X
pj = q
∑
i∈N
vi(S
g
i )−q
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Sg
i
pj+
∑
j∈X
pj ≥ qval(g).
Lemma 3 Any q-quasi-Walrasian equilibrium is a q-local-equilibrium.
Proof: Let (f, p) be a q-quasi-Walrasian equilibrium. Let us show that the
three conditions of Definition 2 are satisfied. Condition 1 is explicitly satisfied
by Definition 8. For Individual Rationality, notice that, for any i ∈ N ,
vi(S
f
i )−
∑
j∈Sf
i
pj ≥ q (vi(∅)− 0) = 0.
Equation (7) is satisfied even with a parameter q equal to 1. For Outward
Stability note that
vi(S
f
i )−
∑
j∈Sf
i
pj ≥ q (vi(Sfi ∪ A)−
∑
j∈Sf
i
∪A
pj)
and therefore
∑
j∈A
pj ≥ vi(Sfi ∪ A)− vi(Sfi ) = vi(A | Sfi ).
Let us now consider the q-quasi-Walrasian equilibria of Example 4. Both
agents have the same valuation v. We shall show that there are no such
equilibria for any q > 0. First, assume that agent 1 receives an empty bundle
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in a q-quasi-Walrasian equilibrium. His utility is 0 and therefore, comparing
with receiving two of the three items, we see that
0 ≥ q (3− p1 − p2), 0 ≥ q (3− p1 − p3), 0 ≥ q (3− p2 − p3)
and therefore, if q > 0, p1 + p2 + p3 ≥ 4.5. Note that the parameter q has
disappeared from the inequality. If agent 2 is allocated the whole bundle of
three items, he must prefer this to the empty bundle and we must have:
4− p1 − p2 − p3 ≥ q 0 = 0
which is impossible. But, if an item, say item 3 is unallocated, we must have
p3 = 0 and p1 + p2 ≥ 4.5. Allocating the bundle (1, 2) to agent 2 would imply
3− p1 − p2 ≥ q 0 = 0
which is impossible. We conclude that at least two items must be unallocated,
but this can be shown similarly to imply that no item is allocated, which
is clearly impossible. We have shown that there is no q-quasi-Walrasian
equilibrium for q > 0 in which some agent receives an empty bundle.
Suppose now that agent 1 is allocated a single item, say item 3. We must
have
0− p3 ≥ q 0 = 0
and therefore p3 = 0. Since agent 1 prefers item 3 to all three items we have:
0− p3 = 0 ≥ q (4− p1 − p2)
and p1 + p2 ≥ 4. In such a situation, agent 2 cannot be allocated the pair
(1, 2), nor can he be allocated any single item.
We conclude that, if q > 0, in any q-quasi-Walrasian eqilibrium each of
the two agents must be allocated at least two of the three items, which is
impossible. The only q-quasi-Walrasian equilibria have q = 0.
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